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Although key distribution is arguably the most studied context on which to apply quantum cryp-
tographic techniques, message authentication, i.e., certifying the identity of the message originator
and the integrity of the message sent, can also benefit from the use of quantum resources. Classi-
cally, message authentication can be performed by techniques based on hash functions. However,
the security of the resulting protocols depends on the selection of appropriate hash functions, and on
the use of long authentication keys. In this paper we propose a quantum authentication procedure
that, making use of just one qubit as the authentication key, allows the authentication of binary
classical messages in a secure manner.
PACS numbers: 3.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Lx.
I. INTRODUCTION
As computer networks spread worldwide with users ac-
cessing them via millions of different terminals, informa-
tion protection becomes more and more relevant. This
challenge of providing adequate information protection
is closely related to the basic tasks of cryptography: au-
thentication and secrecy [1, 2]. During the last decade
it has been shown that information has a physical, not
only mathematical, dimension and, as such, can be stud-
ied making use of Quantum Theory. This has given birth
to the research field known as Quantum Information The-
ory (QIT) (see, e.g., [3, 4, 5]). Quantum Cryptography
(QC), first introduced byWiesner [6] and Bennett and co-
workers [7], is, with Quantum Computation, one of the
most remarkable applications of QIT. The information
security provided by QC is based on fundamental prop-
erties of Quantum Mechanics, instead of on unproven as-
sumptions concerning the computational complexity of
some algorithms (as it is the case of most of Classical
Cryptography), and therefore brings a whole new dimen-
sion to security in communications. Over the last few
years there have been several experimental demonstra-
tions of the feasibility of QC [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]
which seem to indicate that the prospects for its future
mainstream use are good.
QC involves several topics, and although Quantum
Key Distribution (QKD) [16, 17, 18] is arguably the most
studied one, the necessity to combine QKD protocols
with classical authentication methods has motivated re-
cent investigations on the achievement of key verification
[19, 20] and user authentication [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26] in
a quantum-mechanical secure manner. Key verification
consists of assuring that the parties of a key-distribution
scheme are the legitimate ones, and that the key estab-
lished is authentic. User authentication (also called user
identification) allows a communicator to prove his/her
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identity, often as the first step to log into a system. One
potential insecurity of user authentication consists of as-
suming that once the log-in process has concluded, the
transmission remains authentic for the rest of the com-
munication. This assumption strongly depends on the
level of security provided by the channel used. Classi-
cal Cryptography solves this weakness employing mes-
sage authentication codes (MACs), which enable parties
owning a shared secret key to achieve data integrity. A
MAC, also known as a data authentication code, is essen-
tially a scheme specified by two algorithms: an encoding
or tagging algorithm (possibly stochastic), and a decod-
ing or verification algorithm. When the sender (Alice)
wants to send a certified message to a recipient (Bob),
she computes, employing the encoding algorithm, a tag
(as a function of the message and a secret key previously
shared) and appends it to the message. On the reception
side, Bob verifies the authenticity of the tag by means of
the specified decoding procedure, which depends on the
message, tag, and shared key. This algorithm returns a
bit indicating when Bob must regard the message as au-
thentic and accept it as coming from Alice, and when
he must discard it. Wegman and Carter [27, 28] de-
scribed a message-authentication scheme whose security
is information-theoretic, rather than based on computa-
tional assumptions. Their technique uses a hash function,
selected from a Universal Hash Family, to compress the
message to be certified into a smaller string of bits. Then
this string is encrypted to produce the tag.
Recently, Barnum [29] has addressed the problem of
authenticating quantum messages. In his protocols the
authentication key is used to select a quantum error-
detection code (QEDC) from a given set. A quantum
state is encoded in one of these codes, and the state is
rejected as inauthentic if an error is detected by the re-
cipient. The geometry of the set of QEDCs is chosen such
that it ensures that the probability of undetected forgery
is less than the classical bound (inverse of the square root
of the number of keys).
In this paper we study how the use of quantum re-
sources can improve the authentication of classical mes-
sages. Specifically, we present a broad class of quan-
2tum authentication schemes that, unlike classical MACs,
which need at least two secret bits to achieve a probabil-
ity of forgery less than one, provide secure data integrity
when only one-qubit key is shared between the commu-
nicating partners.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we de-
scribe a class of quantum message-authentication codes
that requires just one qubit as the key to authenticate
binary messages. In Section III we analyze the secu-
rity of these protocols against various attacks of increas-
ing severity. First, we analyze the no-message attack,
in which the sender has not initiated the transmission
(there is no message in the channel), and the adversary
(Eve) attempts to prepare a message with the goal of
passing Bob’s verification test. Then, we analyze more
subtle attacks, those in which Eve has access to what
is transmitted. We also discuss, in Section III, how the
security of the protocol is modified if the authentication
keys are reused. Finally, we present our conclusions in
Section IV.
II. QUANTUM MESSAGE-AUTHENTICATION
CODES
Suppose Alice needs to send a certified classical mes-
sage to Bob. The goal is to make Bob confident about the
authenticity of the message and sender. The protocols
described in this section require a quantum channel, so
the first task consists of assigning a quantum state to each
possible classical message. This decision needs no secrecy
and can be made openly. We will discuss the simple case
of binary messages (one-bit long). Thus, there are only
two possible messages, ‘0’ and ‘1’, to which we assign the
pure quantum states |φ0〉 and |φ1〉, respectively. In or-
der to guarantee Bob’s perfect extraction of information
from these states and to make authentication possible,
they cannot be selected arbitrarily, but must be orthogo-
nal, 〈φi|φj〉 = δij , with i, j ∈ {0, 1}; and must contain, as
in any authentication method, some tag information to
be checked by Bob. We will assume that they belong to a
two-qubit state space (a four-dimensional Hilbert space)
E . This can be seen as if the first qubit carried the mes-
sage information, and the second qubit carried the tag.
As for the secret authentication key, we will assume that
Alice and Bob share a two-qubit maximally entangled
state: Each owns one qubit of a publicly-known singlet
state |ψ〉AB = 1√
2
(|01〉AB − |10〉AB).
The authentication procedure goes as follows: When
Alice wants to send a certified bit i, she prepares two
qubits in the state |φi〉 and performs the following encod-
ing operation on her part of |ψ〉AB and on the message:
EAE = |0〉〈0|A1E + |1〉〈1|AUE , (1)
where UE is some publicly-known unitary quantum oper-
ation. Basically, the result of this encoding operation can
be seen as performing (second term in (1)) or not (first
term in (1)), depending on the state of Alice’s qubit of
the shared key, a unitary operation, UE , on the quantum
state |φi〉. This could also be accomplished with a pre-
viously shared classical bit acting as a key. The singlet
can be seen as a superposition of all possible classical key
states.
After performing this tagging operation, the state of
the global system (Alice+Bob+message) is
1√
2
(|01〉AB|φi〉 − |10〉ABUE |φi〉) . (2)
Using the density operator formalism, the state of the au-
thenticated message that Alice sends to Bob can be ob-
tained from (2) performing the partial trace over the Al-
ice+Bob variables. In density operator terms, this state
is given by
ρ′ =
1
2
(ρi + UEρiU
†
E), (3)
where ρi = |φi〉〈φi|. On the reception side, Bob decodes
the information sent by Alice performing the decoding
operation
DBE = |0〉〈0|BU †E + |1〉〈1|B1E (4)
on his part of |ψ〉AB and the message received. Finally,
Bob performs an orthogonal measurement on the space
E . Since this space is four-dimensional, and we have im-
posed the states |φ0〉 and |φ1〉 to be orthonormal, we
can perform this measurement on the orthonormal set
{|φi〉; i = 0, . . . , 3}, where |φ2〉 and |φ3〉 are two extra
orthonormal states. If the result of such a measurement
is one of the two first elements of the set, Bob should
assume that no forgery has taken place, and therefore
obtain the classical message sent to him. If this is not
the case, he rejects the message received.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The class of quantum protocols of the previous section
provides perfect deterministic decoding, i.e., the quan-
tum key |ψ〉AB and the quantum ciphertext ρ′ uniquely
determine the classical message sent, ρi. This means that
these protocols would fail only if Bob accepted a message
as an authenticated one when that is not the case (due to
the unnoticed action of Eve). When dealing with forgery
strategies we must consider two main types of attacks:
The no-message attack, and the message attack. The
first one is the simplest: Before Alice’s sending any mes-
sage to Bob, Eve attempts to prepare a quantum state
that passes the decoding algorithm. The message attack
is more subtle and severe: Eve could access authentic
messages transmitted, and try to produce a forged mes-
sage based on the information gained. The purpose of
3this section is to analyze both families of attacks, and ob-
tain the class of unitary operations UE that makes them
unsuccessful. In the following discussion we will consider
the ideal scenario of an error-free quantum channel.
A. No-message attack
Suppose Eve prepares a normalized pure quantum
state |ǫ〉 ∈ E and sends it to Bob trying to imperson-
ate Alice. In the most general case, this inauthentic pure
quantum message can be described as |ǫ〉 =∑3i=0 ei|φi〉.
When Bob receives this quantum message he cannot
know that it comes from a forger, so he follows the pro-
cedure explained in the previous section: He performs a
decoding operation and then an orthogonal measurement
over the set {|φi〉; i = 0, . . . , 3}. Before this measurement
takes place, the state of the message can be described by
ρ′E = (ρE + U
†
EρEUE)/2, where ρE = |ǫ〉〈ǫ|. As we have
seen, Bob rejects the message if the result of his mea-
surement is one of the last two elements of this basis;
therefore, the probability Pf that Eve deceives Bob is:
Pf =
1∑
i=0
〈φi|ρ′E |φi〉 =
1
2
1∑
i=0
(|ei|2 + |〈ǫ|UE |φi〉|2) . (5)
This quantity depends both on Eve’s strategy and on
the quantum operation UE . The normalization of |ǫ〉 and
the unitarity of UE make both terms on the right side of
(5) to be less or equal than 0.5. The first term depends
entirely on Eve’s decision, and, to be 0.5, e2 and e3 must
be zero. We will assume that Eve selects |ǫ〉 such as
this condition is fulfilled. Let us focus on the second
term, 1/2
∑
1
i=0 |〈ǫ|UE |φi〉|2. First, let us write the matrix
representation of UE in the block form
UE =
(
M0 M1
M2 M3
)
, (6)
where the Mi are 2 × 2 complex matrices. With this
notation, the second term in the right side of (5) can be
written as
1
2
[(|M¯0
0
|2 − |M¯1
0
|2) |e0|2+
2|M¯1
0
M¯0†
0
||e0|
√
1− |e0|2 cos θE + |M¯10 |2
]
, (7)
where M¯ ji represents the j-row of the i-block of UE , and
θE is an angle that depends entirely on Eve’s choice of
her state. Eve’s goal is to make Pf as big as possible, so
the worst case for Alice and Bob occurs when Eve chooses
θE = 2πk with k any integer, and a |e0| that maximizes
(7) for a given UE . We can distinguish between two cases:
1. If |M¯1
0
M¯0†
0
| = 0, the maximum of (7) is strictly less
than 0.5 when |M¯0
0
|2 < 1 and |M¯1
0
|2 < 1.
2. If |M¯1
0
M¯0†
0
| 6= 0, the maximum of (7) is strictly less
than 0.5 when
1
2
x
{
1+
(
x
y
)[
1+
(
x
y
)2]−1/2}
+
1
2
y
[
1+
(
x
y
)2]1/2
+z < 1,
(8)
where the real variables x, y and z are |M¯0
0
|2 −
|M¯1
0
|2, 2|M¯1
0
M¯0†
0
| and |M¯1
0
|2, respectively.
Note that, in both cases, Alice and Bob can select UE
such that its M0 block makes Pf < 1 independently of
Eve’s choice of |ǫ〉.
Finally, in this subsection we have assumed that Eve
prepares a pure state |ǫ〉; however, she could have pre-
pared a general mixed state ρE =
∑
3
i=0 pi|ǫi〉〈ǫi|, with∑
3
i=0 pi = 1. From what we have shown in this subsec-
tion, it is straightforward to see that if UE is selected sat-
isfying the conditions above, then also in this case Pf < 1.
In fact, we can further show that, with the appropriate
selection of UE , Pf can be made at most 1/2. Accord-
ing to (5), Pf can be written as Pf = Tr (ρ
′
EP ), where
ρ′E =
(
ρE + U
†
EρEUE
)
/2 and P = |φ0〉〈φ0| + |φ1〉〈φ1|.
Using the properties of the trace operator,
Pf = Tr (ρEQ) /2, (9)
where Q = UEPU
†
E + P is a positive operator known to
Eve, and with maximum eigenvalue λmax ≥ 1. Therefore,
the maximizing ρE is any eigenvector corresponding to
λmax, and thus Pf = λmax/2. Finally, it is easy to see
(see, e.g., [30]) that choosing UE such that it takes P to its
orthogonal complement makes λmax = 1, and therefore,
as predicted, Pf = 1/2.
B. Message attack
As we have seen, this is a more subtle and severe class
of attacks. Instead of directly forge a quantum message
and send it to Bob, Eve could wait for Alice’s original
messages and try to manipulate them. Thus, Eve’s goal
is to convert authentic messages into others passing Bob’s
test. In the simple case we are dealing with (binary mes-
sages), this implies converting |φ0〉 into |φ1〉 and vice
versa.
In order to simplify the analysis, and without loss of
generality, we will distinguish between two types of mes-
sage attacks. In the first one, Eve, based on the knowl-
edge of all the public aspects of the quantum authen-
tication scheme used, determines a quantum operation
and applies it to any message sent by Alice. This quan-
tum operation can be described by a trace-preserving
completely-positive (TPCP) map. In the second class of
attacks, Eve also tries to extract information, by means
of the appropriate measurement of the message in the
4channel, that allows her to prepare a different message
that Bob regards as authentic.
1. TPCP map
Consider that Alice sends to Bob a quantum message
|φi〉, with i ∈ {0, 1}, and Eve performs an arbitrary
TPCP map, M, on it. The new state in the channel
is ρ′E = M(ρ′), with ρ′ given by (3). Eve chooses M
such that the decoding procedure performed by Bob on
the resulting state lead to the state |φj〉, with j ∈ {0, 1},
and j 6= i. Owing to the pure character of the states |φ0〉
and |φ1〉, this can only be done with certainty if M is a
unitary operation, that we will write as UE . For this kind
of operation, the probability, P ′f (i), of Eve achieving her
goal is 〈φj |ρ′′E |φj〉, where ρ′′E , Bob’s decoded state, is
ρ′′E =
1
2
(
UEρiU
†
E + U
†
EUEUEρiU
†
EU
†
EUE
)
, (10)
with ρi = |φi〉〈φi|. Therefore,
P ′f (i) =
1
2
(|〈φj |UE |φi〉|2 + |〈φj |U †EUEUE |φi〉|2). (11)
If Alice prepares the state |φi〉 with probability pi, the
overall probability of, employing a TPCP, substituting
an authentic message with a different one that passes
Bob’s test is P ′f =
∑
i piP
′
f (i). This probability is one if
UE simultaneously satisfies, up to some arbitrary global
phase factors, the following two pairs of conditions:
|φj〉 = UE |φi〉, (12)
and
|φj〉 = U †EUEUE |φi〉, (13)
∀ i, j ∈ {0, 1}, with i 6= j. The orthogonality between
|φ0〉 and |φ1〉 allows Eve to always fulfill one of the two
pairs of conditions independently of the particular UE
employed by Alice and Bob. Let us assume that Eve se-
lects UE such that (12) is satisfied. This selection makes
UE to have, in the orthonormal base {|φi〉; i = 0, . . . , 3},
the following block representation:
UE =
(
ME
0
0
0 ME
1
)
(14)
withME
0
= eiαS(β)σx, where α is an arbitrary phase, σx
is the standard Pauli matrix, and S(β) is a phase-shift
operation, whose matrix representation is
S(β) =
(
1 0
0 eiβ
)
; (15)
and ME
1
is any 2 × 2 unitary matrix. Now, if
we further demand the fulfillment of (13), the ma-
trix elements of UE and UE must obey 〈φk|UE |φi〉 =∑
3
l=0〈φk|UE|φl〉〈φl|UE |φj〉 ∀k ∈ {0, . . . , 3}. With the
notation of UE introduced in equation (14), this im-
plies that M0
0
,M1
0
,M0
2
and M1
2
, where M ji represents
the j-column of the i-block of UE , must satisfy M00 =
eiγS(δ)σxM
1
0
and, M0†
2
M1
2
= 0 or M0
2
= eiχM1
2
, where
γ, δ and χ are such that UE is a unitary operation. If
Alice and Bob choose UE such that all these requirements
are not verified, then the probability of successful tam-
pering will be strictly less than one, independently of
Eve’s TPCP map.
2. Measurement
Let us assume now that, instead of performing a pre-
determined quantum operation on the message sent by
Alice, Eve makes a measurement on it trying to gain in-
formation about the key. If she were able to collapse the
state of the key in a known unentangled pure state, she
could throw away Alice’s message and prepare and send
to Bob an unauthentic new one that would pass his test
with certainty. Since Eve knows how the protocol works,
she would achieve this if she could distinguish perfectly
between the two terms on the right-hand side of (3).
In order to avoid this attack, Alice and Bob must
choose UE such that the set of states {|φi〉, UE |φi〉}, with
i = 0, 1, is not orthogonal. Owing to the orthogonality
of |φ0〉 and |φ1〉, this requirement can be rewritten as
〈φi|UE |φj〉 6= 0 for, at least, one i and j, with i, j ∈ {0, 1}.
With the block notation introduced in previous sections,
this condition can be expressed as |M0
0
| > 0 or |M1
0
| > 0.
Although no secrecy is necessary for secure authentica-
tion, note that if 〈φi|UE |φj〉 6= 0, with i 6= j, the quantum
authentication scheme also provides, in some sense, data
encryption, since there is a probability bigger than zero,
of Eve not determining which message Alice sent.
C. Discussion
MACs are used to detect any attempt to modify the
transmitted data by an undesired third party. In this
section we have concentrated on several types of attacks
which, we believe, are the most demanding. We have
shown that, in order to avoid the forgery strategies stud-
ied, Alice and Bob should agree to choose UE such that
the following conditions are satisfied:
1. If |M¯1
0
M¯0†
0
| = 0, then |M¯0
0
|2 < 1 and |M¯1
0
|2 < 1.
2. If |M¯1
0
M¯0†
0
| 6= 0, then equation (8) must be verified.
3. M0
0
6= eiγS(eiδ)σxM10 , or M0†2 M12 6= 0 and M02 6=
eiχM1
2
.
4. |M0
0
| > 0 or |M1
0
| > 0.
5Of these four conditions, it is straightforward to see,
however, that the last one, obtained in order to avoid the
determination of the key by measurement, is redundant,
since the fulfillment of the third condition leads to the
fourth one.
After examining the three remaining conditions, two
questions arise: (i) Can a unitary operation simultane-
ously fulfill these three restrictions? and, (ii) If the an-
swer is yes, what is the optimum UE? Perhaps the easiest
way to answer the first question is with a trivial example.
If, for instance, M¯0
0
= (0.5 0.5) and M¯1
0
= (0 0), it is
straightforward to construct a unitary operation with its
first block equal to M0. Moreover, it is evident that all
the above conditions are satisfied by this matrix. As for
the second question, it is an important open issue that
we plan to address in the future. First one should estab-
lish some appropriate criterion according to which obtain
such an optimum UE . When we analyzed no-message at-
tacks, we showed that, selecting an appropriate UE , Pf
can be made 1/2 regardless of Eve’s strategy. Never-
theless, it is straightforward to see that this particular
unitary quantum operation makes P ′f one, thus making
the protocol vulnerable. Therefore, it seems that the op-
timization should result from a balance of the different
forgery strategies considered.
Finally, one interesting property of this class of quan-
tum authentication protocols is that it provides the pos-
sibility of reusing the authentication keys: If there is no
forgery, then after Alice’s encoding and Bob’s decoding
processes the state of the key remains intact. Thus, if
the authentication procedure is successful, in principle
Alice and Bob could retain the entangled key and reuse
it in the next run of the protocol. The presence of Eve,
however, cannot be despised. She could try to entangle
an ancilla system with the quantum authentication key
generating a global state of the form:
|φ〉ABE = α|01〉AB|φ〉E − β|10〉AB|φ⊥〉E , (16)
with |φ〉ABE ∈ K ⊗ A, where K and A denote the
state spaces of the key and the ancilla systems, respec-
tively; |φ〉E and |φ⊥〉E represent two arbitrary orthonor-
mal states in A; and α and β are two arbitrary complex
numbers satisfying |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. If equation (16) is
verified, Eve could always forge messages when the key
is reused, just reproducing Alice’s encoding process, but
employing her ancilla as the control of the quantum op-
eration.
If we assume that Eve has access only to the quan-
tum channel between Alice and Bob, which we believe is
a reasonable assumption, then Eve could try to obtain
(16) in two different ways. She could prepare a quantum
message and send it to Bob, or she could manipulate the
message sent by Alice. The first possibility can be ne-
glected, since, if UE satisfies the conditions enumerated
above, Eve cannot know when a run of the protocol has
been successful. As for the second possibility, it must not
be confused with the one previously analyzed when deal-
ing with TPCP maps. Now Eve does not need to convert
|φ0〉 into |φ1〉 and vice versa. She can prepare |ψ〉E ∈ A
and apply a unitary operation UE⊗A of the form:
UE⊗A
[
1√
2
(|φi〉|01〉AB − UE |φi〉|10〉AB)⊗ |ψ〉E
]
, (17)
trying to achieve UE⊗A(|φi〉|ψ〉E) = (α|φi〉 + β|φj〉)|φ〉E
and UE⊗A(UE |φi〉|ψ〉E) = (γUE |φi〉 + δUE |φj〉)|φ⊥〉E ,
with i, j ∈ {0, 1}, and α, β, γ, δ some complex parame-
ters such that |α|2 + |β|2 = |γ|2 + |δ|2 = 1. If UE is cho-
sen such that 〈φi|UE |φi〉 6= 0, for some i ∈ {0, 1}, then
|φi〉 and UE |φi〉 are not orthogonal for at least one value
of i. Therefore, and since the inner product of states
is preserved by any unitary operation, these conditions
are impossible to fulfill. This means that equation (16)
cannot be achieved with certainty.
Nevertheless, and although key recycling is in princi-
ple possible, it should be noticed that the security of the
authentication protocols presented may be drastically re-
duced. As suggested in [31], security does not depend on
the use of entanglement, but on the possibility of detect-
ing Eve’s presence in the quantum ciphertext. As we
have seen, these authentication schemes can detect Eve
with a certain probability, but there is also a chance that
Eve remains undetected.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have presented a broad class of quantum authen-
tication protocols that, making use of just one qubit as
the authentication key, allow the authentication of bi-
nary classical messages with a probability of successful
forgery less than one. All parties, including the forger,
may have full knowledge about all aspects of the proto-
col; however, it requires sharing a previous secret (in the
form of an entangled pair of particles, or a classical bit),
and an ideal quantum channel between the partners.
We have described several types of possible attacks and
shown that careful selection of the quantum transforma-
tion performed by the communicating parties makes the
protocol secure against these attacks. However, a further
more extensive security analysis in a more realistic sce-
nario (a non-perfect channel), as well as the derivation of
the optimum UE in such circumstances, is needed.
Finally, we have also shown that the protocol authen-
tication keys can be reused. However, this reduces the
security of the protocol.
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